ЧЕТВРТА ПРОГРАМА

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 7. THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE ELITES

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 18:15:41 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 7. THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE ELITES

With the gap widening between the people and the dominant class, political legitimacy and political reality are also divorced from each other. Photo: Pixabay

18.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

“Without an implosion of the political traditional political system, the division and the break up of French society seems inevitable,” wrote Christophe Guilluy.

Such is the major characteristic of populism: it reveals an opposition, not horizontal (right-left), but vertical: the people against the elites, the ordinary folks from “below” against the privileged from “above”. This opposition doesn't recycle the old poujadiste [Translator's note: Referring to the protest movement of shopkeepers and smallholders against the Fourth Republic lead by Pierre Poujade] rancor of the “little” against the “big.” It rests on the conviction that a technocratic and financial elite, settled in the media as in the aisles of power, founded on incestuous connivance, if not corruption, has deliberately decided to dispossess the voters of their power in order to escape any control over its actions. This elite, which is only divided on the means of implementing the same goals, adheres to values and spreads slogans in which the people do not recognize themselves. It imposes orientations that the people condemn because they notice that it results in a deterioration of their way of life. Cut off from social reality, it is moreover perceived as foreign to the nation in the measure where it is both indifferent to national interests and profoundly de-territorialized. As in 1793, the elites are perceived as the “foreigner's party” - or more exactly, as the party that considers every form of collective identity obsolete and so that nothing is foreign anymore.

The opposition between the dominant and the dominated thus makes its great return. “People” have replaced the people. The dominant ideology, majoritarian in the powerful milieus, increasingly minoritarian in the popular classes, is usually linked to a new class. Seeking the guidelines that it has lost, the people show their allergy to a New Class that believes itself exempt from common rule that the “little folks” are subjected to and whose way of life separates them, apart (and above) from the people, manifesting an irresistible propensity for nomadism, perpetual change, the rejection of roots, contempt of communitarian and popular values, a headlong rush into the frenetic search for profit, a limitless permissiveness, a fascination with the “winners.” Elected through neo-capitalist globalization, this political-media New Class was formed as a result of an intensification of mobility in a climate marked by the deregulation of the market and technological innovations shrinking space and time. It unites political leaders, businessmen, and media representatives, all intimately linked to one another, all convinced of the “danger” of popular aspirations, in the same elitism of wealth and status .

It's this ruling class that finds itself confronted with the eternal return of the people today. And this confrontation surpasses all the old divides. “It is possible,” as Marcello Veneziani had already said in 1995. In turn, Christophe Guilluy observes today that “the fracture is not so much between left and right than between the dominant classes, indifferent to right and left, and the popular classes.”

The principal divide (but not the only one) henceforth opposes those who benefit from globalization, whether they are right wing or left wing, to those who are the victims of globalization – those who think in terms of peoples and those who only want to conceive of individuals and humanity. It's what contrasts peripheral France to urbanized France, the people to the globalist elites, the ordinary folks to the New Class, the popular and declining middle classes to the big globalist bourgeoisie, the advocates of borders to the partisans of “openness,” the “invisibles” to the “over-represented”, in short those on the bottom to those on the top. The true divide is the defense of the people – the cause of the people.

Извор: “Boulevard Voltaire, Geoполитика.ru“

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 6. THE INVERSION OF VALUES

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 18:05:19 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 6. THE INVERSION OF VALUES

The unleashing of the logic of limitlessness into a world deprived of guidelines inspires a deep identitarian and existential malaise in spirits. Photo: Pixabay

16.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

Boulevard Voltaire introduces its readers to a recent book that the editorial team appreciated. Every day, a new extract is published. Le Moment populiste. Droite-gauche, c’est fini!, by Alain de Benoist.

The idea of progress, the secular form of the belief in Providence, has entered into crisis itself, and the idea that tomorrow will necessarily be better than today has nearly died under the effect of the dynamic of permanent acceleration theorized by Hartmut Rosa. The “singing tomorrows” have disappeared, their place taken by a diffuse fear of the future that nourishes thoughts of catastrophe and phantasms of disaster. “The future contains no more promises” (André Gorz). This fear of the future, mainly deemed to be the bearer of threats, is paradoxically accompanied by a tendency to erase the past. “The refusal of the past, a superficially progressive and optimistic attitude, reveals, upon analysis, the manifestation of hopelessness in a society incapable of facing the future,” remarked Christopher Lasch. All “presentism” forbids us from representing the future as anything other than a leap into the unknown

This loss of references is especially due to the fact that, for the dominant ideology, man is not fundamentally social and that he can construct himself from nothing, moreover all men are treated as fundamentally identical (“the same”) and therefore interchangeable with each other. In the normative scheme, the objective then becomes to favor everything that permits man to become even more “independent” from his fellows: the exaltation of “nomadism,” the free circulation of men and capital, the praise for hybridization of every type, the negation of collective identities, the eradication of particular cultures, the programmed amnesia of past, the elimination of identitarian concerns, criticism of every form of belonging and descent. The “liberalization of mores” itself results from the necessity to subject every area of social life to capitalist consumption, the left is only committed to an indeterminate liberty, indifferent to institutional and social-historic conditions allowing it to be established, a conception of liberty which is also the conception of liberal anthropology.

But the people does not interpret the suppression of all norms as synonymous with greater freedom. Spontaneously hostile to a “counter-culture” that endeavored to deconstruct all guidelines on the basis of an abstract conception of freedom devoid of any reference to a substantial normative framework, it confusedly perceives that to be free is not to break away and refuse but to join and participate (in bonds, in circumstances, in ways of living), which implies recognizing conditions (notably reciprocal obligations) that allow for the autonomy of human communities. In a world where all forms of authority are de-legitimized, one after the other, with the sole exception of the technical authority of “experts,” and the only institutions called upon to regulate human relations are juridical contract and mercantile exchange, the people happen to realize that this loss of meaning is linked in some way to economic relations superseding social relations, the primacy of the economy and the “furies of private interest” (Marx) leading to a reification of human existence that puts an end to organic social relations, to human interdependence. “The economy transforms the world, but only into the world of economics,” said Guy Debord.

The unleashing of the logic of limitlessness into a world deprived of guidelines inspires a deep identitarian and existential malaise in spirits. When one speaks of populism, we must take this malaise into account, even more aggravated by the internalization of the idea that there is no alternative to the disappearance of every horizon of meaning within the world of economic reproduction: “The world must no longer be interpreted or changed: it must be endured” ( Peter Sloterdijk). “Our heritage makes us poorly adapted in relation to a world that devalues what we valued spontaneously and elevates what we looked down on to the forefront.” Marcel Gauchet observes. The people are deeply affected to this inversion of values.

Извор: “Boulevard Voltair, Geoполитика.ru“

"LE MOMENT POPULIST", PART 5. THERE`S NO "SHIFTING TO THE RIGHT"

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 17:55:38 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULIST", PART 5. THERE`S NO "SHIFTING TO THE RIGHT"

To speak of “shifting to the right” would only be a lazy way of interpreting such an evolution. Photo: Pixabay

15.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

By deceiving the people, by working for the destruction of everything it was attached to, by allying itself with the predators of market society, by putting on a show of autism, indecency, and corruption in turn, the left has cut itself off from the popular classes and thrown them into the arms of populist movements who pretended they would really speak in their name. Jean-Claude Michéa was correct when he wrote “it's not so much in the moral darkness of a part of the popular classes (or in their “lack of instruction”) that we must search for the real reasons of the rise of the “extreme right.” Instead, conversely, it's in the reaction of indignation of these classes towards a political and intellectual movement that advocates destroying (at they have the firm conviction, at least in their eyes) all the moral virtues and traditions to which they are attached, in the name of “science”, “modernity” and the “natural” evolution of mores – starting with, as Orwell underlines, their religious faith, their sense of personal effort, and their patriotism.”

Between the legislative elections of 1978 and the presidential election of 2002, the percentage of working class and white collar employees who voted for the left fell in a revealing fashion from 27% to 15%. The last elections revealed that nearly 50% of workers today vote for the Front National. That doesn't mean workers constitute a majority of the FN's electorate (they only represent about 13%), but that this party is over-represented in the world of labor, which doubtlessly contributes to discredit it among the elites. […] Also recall that in the referendum on the project of the European constitutional treaty, 60% of the youth, 80% of the working class, and 60% of white collar workers, a majority of wage earners, voted “no,” the “yes” ultimately had a majority only in the haute bourgeoisie, among the upper classes, people out of the workforce, and retirees. […]

To speak of “shifting to the right” would only be a lazy way of interpreting such an evolution. It is evident that left and right no longer mean anything at a moment where the most prevalent opinion is that all the major parties, on the left and the right, say more or less the same thing – and only compete, at best, regarding the means to implement the same policies. In reality, the left-right divide no longer has any operational value to analyze new political phenomena, starting with the rise of populism. The proof is in the programs of the populist parties that frequently link themes of the left and themes of the right. In Greece, Alexis Tsipras, boss of Syriza, preferred to form his own government by allying the with a souverainiste party classified as right wing, the Independent Greeks (ANEL), rather than with the groupings of the traditional left, starting with Pasok. In France, one even saw the economist Jacques Sapir plead for an alliance between the Front National and the Front de gauche. It is also remarkable that in Great Britain, the leadership of the two major parties, conservative and labor, was favorable to Remain, which signifies that “Brexit” won by gathering votes from the supporters of both parties. In the United States, where the right-left dyad was hardly superimposable onto the Republican – Democrat pairing already, one likewise saw “neocon” personalities from the Republican party, not least (Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, Brent Scowcroft, Richard Armitage, James Kirchik, Max Boot, Bret Stephens, etc.), announce that they would vote for Hillary Clinton, qualified as a “true conservative” on the occasion, the only one capable of resisting “systemic change.”

Извор:“Boulevard Voltaire, Geополитика.ru“

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 4. WHY THE POLITICAL IS STRUCK BY ILLEGITIMACY

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 17:46:07 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 4. WHY THE POLITICAL IS STRUCK BY ILLEGITIMACY

The gap between the political class and the electorate constitutes a problem. Photo: Flickr

14.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

For a long time the people believed that things would get better if they changed the government. Noticing that nothing distinguishes the major parties, who pretended to oppose each other until recently, they no longer believe it. It's always the same result, therefore the same deception. If one tries to analyze it in market terms, political life is characterized by an increasingly reduced supply against an increasingly disgruntled, increasingly disoriented demand. Depression first favors abstention, then the protest vote, and then populism. Populist parties have actually been the first to perceive a change in the political and social demand that the traditional parties do not understand because they are mental prisoners of the habits and schemes of thought that prevent them from doing so, regardless of the goodwill of their elected representatives – always desirous of being “closer” to their voters. Thus the political class finds itself struck by illegitimacy because it resolves no problem and offers no means to surmount the generalized crisis of the system, but seems to contribute to it on the contrary.

The gap between the political class and the electorate constitutes a problem, especially for the left, which, in the past, had always claimed to represent popular aspirations better than the right. But the left has progressively cut itself off from the people. Left wing intellectuals have abandoned the messianic hopes they formerly placed in the working class, while the political elites have progressively cut themselves off from the popular milieus through class contempt. Just like the right, the left settled into the upper middle classes, when it was not in the machinery of the state. By rallying to the market economy, by privileging marginal claims to the detriment of the aspirations of those who are the most threatened by unemployment and insecurity, by giving the show to an elite installed in the media spotlight, it has deeply disappointed those who were supposed to be addressed first.

The people and the left have certainly never been equivalent notions, as one saw during the days of June 1848 and the Commune of 1871, when the republican and bourgeois left fired on the people. (In his famous Histoire de la Commune, published in 1876, Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray recalled that if the Versaillesian bourgeoisie could crush the Parisian proletariat, it was thanks to the “army, the administration, and the left.”) We also know that during the entire 19th century, the left showed itself to be largely indifferent, if not hostile, to the cooperative and mutualist movement. But the fact remains that the evolution of the left for at least thirty years has been something shocking.

In 1979 at the congress of the Socialist Party in Metz, François Mitterrand and his friends presented a programmatic resolution affirming that “economic rigor in the sense meant by the masters of power constitutes a terrific lie.” But in 1992, the socialist project entitled “A new horizon” declared: “Yes, we think that the market economy constitutes the most effective means of production and exchange. No, we no longer believe in a break with capitalism.” One measures the change that occurred. It's what allowed Michel Rocard to redefine socialism as a “sort of tempered capitalism” (sic). In November 1999, Lionel Jospin himself [Translator's Note: Socialist Party politician and Prime Minister of France from 1997-2002] declared that socialism no longer existed, neither as a “doctrinal system” nor “as a system of production, the superiority of the market over planning has been shown to be incontestable.” Of course, it remains to be known if socialism reduces itself to “planning.”

Извор: “Geoполитика.ru“

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 3. THE PRICE OF “CONSENSUS”

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 16:37:36 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 3. THE PRICE OF “CONSENSUS”

Democracy is not soluble in procedural law, as it is an inevitably agonistic form. Photo: The Blue Diamond Gallery

13.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

Moreover, we have witnessed the near disappearance of sociological families, where people voted in the same fashion from generation to generation. Even in the middle of the 1960s, the more Catholic one was, the more one voted to right; and in the social scheme, the more one identified with the working class, the more one voted to the left.

That hasn't been the case for a long time. Electoral volatility hasn't stopped growing – and it's at the point where it's no longer rare to meet people who, in the course of their life, have voted for practically every party. In 1946, François Goguel calculated that between 1877 and 1936 the equilibrium of power between the entire right wing and the left wing groupings in France never varied more than 2%.

Today, we know that 17% of the extreme left voters in the legislative elections of 1986 voted for a right wing party in the first round of the presidential election of 1988, that 60% of François Mitterrand's voters in 1988 refused to vote socialist in 1993, and that nearly four million voters switched sides in the six months that preceded the presidential election of 2012. According to a study by Institut Elabe published in August 2016, the proportion of French people who declare themselves “without party preference” regularly advances, particularly among the youth (26%), laborers (37%), and the white collar workers (38%), while only 14.1% of people questioned felt close to the PS and 16.4% to Les Républicains, in total 30.5% for the governmental parties, in which two thirds of French people no longer recognize themselves […]

In the era of Giscard [Translator's note: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of France from 1974 to 1981], some people rejoiced over the major parties having increasingly similar programs, in the name of the blessings of “consensus” - consensus that Alain Minc didn't hesitate to consider as a “zone of reason.” They were wrong. Firstly because democracy is not the extinction of conflict, but the mastery of conflict. For a political society to function normally, a consensus must evidently be established about the framework and modes of debate.

But if this consensus causes debate itself to disappear, then democracy disappears at the same time, because it implies by definition, if not the plurality of parties, at least the diversity of opinions and choices, while recognizing the legitimacy of a confrontation between these opinions and choices. Which means that, contrary to what the advocates of a “non-partisan” or “governance” inspired democracy believe, democracy is not soluble in procedural law, as it is an inevitably agonistic form. If parties are only separated by insignificant programmatic differences, if competing factions implement fundamentally the same policies, if the objectives or even the means to attain them are no longer distinguishable between one or the others, in short if the citizens are no longer presented real alternatives and true possibilities of choice, then the debate no longer has a purpose and the institutional framework that allowed it to take place becomes an empty shell, from which one cannot be astonished to see a majority of votes turn away. The price of “consensus” is civic desertion.

Извор: “Boulevard Voltaire, Geoполитика.ru“

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 2. THREE DANGEROUS TENDENCIES OF MODERN WORLD

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 16:29:28 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 2. THREE DANGEROUS TENDENCIES OF MODERN WORLD

For many decades the people noticed that their daily lives were deeply effected by developments that they had never been consulted about, that the political class, in all its tendencies, never sought to change or stop. Photo: digitaltrends.com

12.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

In France, the founding event of the populist surge was the victory of “no” in the 2005 referendum regarding the project of the European constitutional treaty, followed by the confiscation of this vote with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty by the Parliament, this time without the people being consulted. This “no” revealed the breadth of the trench that had already formed between the elites and the people, a trench both ideological and sociological. It revealed the defiance of a people who no longer felt represented by those who pretend to speak in its name, those who were accused of only seeking to maintain their privileges and serve their particular interests.

In fact, for many decades the people noticed that their daily lives were deeply effected by developments that they had never been consulted about, that the political class, in all its tendencies, never sought to change or stop.

Firstly, immigration. In the space of two generations, through the mechanism of family reunification and migratory influx, the former temporary immigration has taken on the character of a population changing immigration. Massive, rapid, poorly received and poorly controlled, it has engendered a series of social pathologies in every domain (school, daily life, the world of labor, security, delinquency), created or exacerbated cultural or confessional splits, effected social mores, and deeply transformed the composition of the population […]

Next, the European Union. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the European construction has resulted in the disappearance of entire swathes of state sovereignty, without that sovereignty being transferred to a higher level. […] Already dependents of NATO in the military scheme, subject to the budgetary constraints dictated by the European Union, states are only nominally bearers of a sovereignty which is now only a memory. Moreover, European institutions are put in place from the top down to the bottom. The peoples have not participated in the European construction, and on the rare times where they've been consulted, their opinion hasn't been taken into consideration. Long presented as a solution to every problem, the European construction seems like one problem that adds to the others today. The debates have become increasingly technical, and thus decreasingly comprehensible. Divided, powerless, paralyzed, the European Union has ended up discrediting Europe, which the dominant ideology only conceives as a “container asked to empty itself of all content in order to make room for the Other.” (Élisabeth Lévy) […]

Finally, globalization. Made possible by the collapse of the Soviet system, which symbolized the division of the world into two systems, it represented a major symbolic revolution that changed our relation to the world. […] Through the mechanisms of relocation and competition, in dumping conditions, with the under-paid masses of wage labor of the Third World, it has destroyed the collective negotiation power of the workers, at the same time infringing upon the sovereignty of states, which find themselves forced to abjure the use of their political willpower. Thus a world without borders, without an alternative, ordered by the law of profit alone, has been established. Defended by the business milieus in the name of the principle of free circulation of persons, goods, and capital, globalization is defended by the left through moral cosmopolitanism and abstract humanism, all finding themselves in agreement in order to legitimize international mass migrations, the universalization of norms, downward pressure on salaries and threats to employment. Globalization creates many “winners” among the elites, but millions of losers among the people, who increasingly realize that economic globalization opens the way to cultural globalization – dialectically creating new fragmentation.

Извор: “Boulevard Voltaire, Geoполитика.ru“

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 1. THE RIGHT–LEFT DIVIDE IS OBSOLETE

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 16:20:20 GMT

"LE MOMENT POPULISTE", PART 1. THE RIGHT–LEFT DIVIDE IS OBSOLETE

Everywhere new divides emerge that render the old right – left divide obsolete

11.10.2017

Alain de Benoist

In September 2016, a poll revealed that the presidential election in May 2017 would be “disappointing” for 85% of French people whatever the result. It's a figure that says all. The extraordinary defiance of the ever growing layers of the population towards the “old governmental parties” and the political class in general, to the benefit of new types of movements, which we call “populist”, is without a doubt the most striking fact about the transformations of the political landscape for at least two decades.

This phenomenon, which first touched Southern and Western Europe (Syriza, Podemos, Front National, the Five Star Movement, the Northern League, The Freedom Party), before extending to central Europe, Germany (AfD), Northern Europe (Sweden Democrats Party), and the Anglo-Saxon countries (British “Brexit”), has henceforth even reached the United States (the Trump and Sanders phenomena). Everywhere the gulf separating the people from the installed political class has been confirmed. Everywhere new divides emerge that render the old right – left divide obsolete.

In France, under the Fifth Republic, political life had been long summarized by a regular alternation between two blocs each dominated by a major party. This system was guaranteed by a two round majority voting style which, by favoring a clear distinction between the majority and the opposition (the parliamentary majority becoming synonymous with the governmental majority), seemed to exclude a third contender's arrival in power. But this system no longer functions when a third party conquers more than 25% of the electorate in a lasting manner. Here we are. In the first round of the last departmental elections, the National Front, which was most successful with the youth, the popular classes, and the lower portion of the middle classes, obtained more than five million votes against the 3.3 million of the PS and the 3.2 million of the UMP. In the second round, in the 1,109 cantons where it ran, it scored 35% on average, even positioning itself between 45 and 50% in 99 cantons. In the first round of the regional elections on December 6th 2015, with 27.7% of the votes, it became the first party in France. So one could reckon that about one voter in three votes in favor of the FN today, which confirms that we have entered into a new form of electoral tripartition: the political system henceforth structures itself around three principal formations, each attracting between a quarter and third of the voters […]

The grand event of the American presidential election in this same year 2016 was the collapse of the old style Republican Party, forced to abandon its political philosophy that was attuned to the business world under the strikes of populist protest, and whose candidates most emblematic of its political philosophy, Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio, and Scott Walker, all failed. Here, it's not Donald Trump's persona which should command attention, but the Trump phenomenon, which must immediately be likened to the Bernie Sanders phenomenon among the Democrats. Throughout his campaign, Trump (who is an anti-Reagan as much as an anti-Clinton) capitalized on what his competitors, just like the Republican strategists, had not been able to see: the rise of a powerful popular anti-elite protest, a rejection of the Establishment with which the American political class will henceforth have to reckon. Sanders won 22 states against 28 for Hillary Clinton for nearly the same reasons, starting with his denunciation of Wall Street's influence.

Извор: “Boulevard Voltaire, Geoполитика.ru“

JAY DYER EXPOSING TAVISTOCK INSTITUTE

Име — Sun, 05 Nov 2017 15:42:00 GMT

JAY DYER EXPOSING TAVISTOCK INSTITUTE

We are happy Mickey Mouses lab rats in hand of globalists. In this talk Jay Dyer analyzes Daniel Estulin's book, The Tavistock Institute: Social Engineering the Masses and its profound conclusions. From the "corporate man" to the control of unions by the Rockefellers, the Tavistock plan of mind control and social engineering knows no bounds. Pro sports and pop culture, Beatles and LSD - as well as all of modern living have been shaped by this deep state cult. In hour 2 Jay Dyer covers the occult side of the studies, as well as more details on mind control and pop culture.

Извор: “Geoполитика.ru“

SOUTH AMERICA BETWEEN RETROCESSION & DEVELOPMENT

Име — Wed, 20 Sep 2017 18:38:42 GMT

SOUTH AMERICA BETWEEN RETROCESSION & DEVELOPMENT

20.09.2017

Latin America

Marcelo Gullo

If the stage for South America were that of the frame of a totally open economy, the surpluses of industrial production of the most diverse parts of the orb –naturally or artificially produced- will be dumped onto the South American market, amongst others, and they will end up destroying the industrial park of Argentina-Brazil and, in that same way, throwing large groups of the population into unemployment. For countries like Venezuela, Peru or Colombia, the irruption of the surpluses of global industrial production would inhibit any attempt of industrial development but, for countries like Argentina and Brazil, an uncontained irruption of these surpluses of production, by provoking the annihilation of their industrial parks, would mean a catastrophic set back to the condition these countries held until 1930: that of producers of raw materials and agricultural non-manufactured products and importers of goods and services with better technology. In synthesis, going back to occupying the post that Adam Smith had assigned them in the international division of labor.

Such a setback would not only be incompatible with the sustainment of the current populations of both countries but it would also be incompatible with the preservation of their democratic regimes. The devastation of the Argentine-Brazilian industrial park would mean, therefore, the annihilation of democracy and social hecatomb, a situation that could lead to a process of territorial fragmentation similar to the one lived by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the implosion of the socialist system.

This fragmentation process that, above all in the case of Brazil, might not only be well looked upon by the hegemonic structures of world power but also might be well received on behalf of these important exogenous stimuli. After this eventual social hecatomb, Brazil could end up fragmented into several States. Something like an American “civil war”, but with an inverse result: those regions whose primary production is more important would fall with ease into the temptation of adopting a primarily exporting model and would break loose from the “inefficient” industry and bureaucracies of the rest of the country.

Very on the contrary, if the countries of South America are able to construct an effective “South American Union of Nations” by mid-decade of 2020, that would take them to the implementation of a common economic-diplomatic-military program, they would then be in a condition to negotiate with the rest of the powers, thirsty for raw materials, the possibility of them accepting that the South American community carry out an active pro-industrial policy that will have to be extremely selective so that it will be acknowledged by the international hegemonic structures of power.

Through an active pro-industrial-technological policy, the countries of South America would moderately open up their economies to the industrial production of the rest of the planet. It will not have to do with taking the idea of autarchy to a South American level but rather with determining the productive sectors to safeguard in order to maintain an industrial structure in accordance with the sustenance of the population of South American countries avoiding in that way the possibility of mass unemployment that would inexorably take them, as we have already shown –above all in the cases of Argentina and Brazil-, to a social crisis incompatible with the preservation of their democratic regimes and their respective territorial and national unities.

In exchange, if the stage is one of a “Union of South American Nations”, that is able to establish a diplomatic program in common and a like policy before foreign investment, they could be able to avoid foreign investment from aiming at the achievement of predatory extractive activities that are incompatible with the sustainable development that South American societies need.

Извор: “Katehon“

СВЕРХИСТОРИЧЕСКИЙ СМЫСЛ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЯ РОМАНОВЫХ

Име — Wed, 20 Sep 2017 18:36:35 GMT

СВЕРХИСТОРИЧЕСКИЙ СМЫСЛ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЯ РОМАНОВЫХ

11.09.2017

Россия

Жан Парвулеско

Самуил Хантингтон и великоконтинентальное евразийское видение

Основные тезисы Самуила Хантингтона известны, и, приводя их, я только несколько смещаю цивилизационно-культурный акцент на религиозный.

«Столкновение цивилизаций — основа мировой политики. Линии разделения цивилизаций — будущие линии фронтов». И далее: «Конфликты цивилизаций составляют заключительную фазу эволюции конфликтов в современном мире». Таковы слова Самуила Хантингтона, далее поясняющего: «Линии разделения между цивилизациями как источники кризисов и кровавых конфликтов оказались на месте политических и идеологических границ времен холодной войны. Этой последней было положено начало, когда «железный занавес» политически и идеологически разделил Европу. Закончилась она с его падением. Идеологическое разделение Европы исчезло, но на его месте возникло разделение культурное, разделение на две части — с одной стороны западное христианство, с другой — православие и ислам. Как подчеркивал Уильям Уоллес, разделительная линия Восточной и Западной Европы проходит по восточной границе западного христианства от 1500 года, то есть, по сегодняшней границе России с Финляндией и странами Балтии; далее она рассекает Белоруссию и Украину (последнюю на Западную, где много католиков, и православную Восточную), затем, поворачивая к Западу, отделяет Трансильванию от Румынии, пересекает Югославию как раз по границе Хорватии и Словении и остальной части страны. На Балканах эта линия естественно совпадает с исторической границей между империей Габсбургов и Оттоманской империей».

Сегодня взаимная непримиримость двух европейских станов — католического и православного — ставит под удар весь геополитический проект евразийской имперской интеграции в рамках концепта континентального блока (Kontinentalblock) Карла Хаусхоффера. Вместе с ним под ударом оказалась, и вся наша настоящая и будущая борьба за Евразийскую империю конца.

Все происходит так, как оно происходит и как уже происходило, и только фундаментальный проект Imperium в состоянии сверхисторически преодолеть ход вещей: вернуться к временам, когда римское имперское единство еще не знало разделения на Запад и Восток. Imperium трансцендентально находится выше всех разделений — исторических, религиозных и каких-либо иных.

Трансцендентальный, сверхисторический проект Евразийской империи конца объединяет в себе все прежде бывшие исторические имперские проекты.

«Есть только один рейх, как есть только одна Церковь, — писал Мёллер Ван ден Брук и добавлял: — третий рейх будет вечным».

Важно не только понять, что Мёллер Ван ден Брук говорил совсем не о Третьем рейхе в его последующем, преходящем и отчужденном, национал-социалистическом проявлении, причем говорил тогда, когда гитлеровского Третьего рейха еще не было и в помине, но с визионерским ясновидением указывал на последнюю полноту трансцендентального, иноприродного, последнего, эсхатологического, сверхисторического и божественного начертания Четвертого рейха, Imperium, который есть коронация истории после истории, внутри тысячелетия Христова, Millenium Christi: истинный Третий рейх не есть Третий рейх. Истинный Третий рейх есть Четвертый рейх.

Образ его, пусть исключительно политический, временный, даже символический, едва замысленный, все-таки проявился, всплыл поверх всех идеологических, религиозных и иных границ в германо-советском пакте 1939 года. Евразийском пакте, хотя и не обретшем права на великоконтинентальное измерение, но сумевшем соединить два великоконтинентальных проекта — германский и советский.

Евразийская империя конца и есть этот Четвертый рейх, воплощение принципа Imperium в истории и по ту сторону истории, где открытое религиозное противостояние католицизма и православия обретет свое последнее имперское, евразийское разрешение.

Ибо если не может быть Новой империи, Novum Imperium, и тем более империи конца, Imperium Ultimum, без новой имперской религии, то и Евразийская империя конца должна прежде всего стремиться к собственному религиозному обновлению через внутреннее самоопределение современных религий. Это имперское религиозное обновление последних времен по ту сторону истории будет восполнено новым божественным вмешательством в историю, через новое живое и действенное воплощение Principium единства цикла в его переворачивании и обновлении.

Сверхисторическая трансцендентальная основа Imperium в каждом новом случае сопровождается новым собственным историческим воплощением Principium. Сегодня, хотелось бы сказать, мы идем к Царству Святого Духа, к историческому воплощению Параклета, к софийной истории мира в его конце. Софийная история неразрывно связана с древней миссией Российской империи — освобождением Святой Софии в Константинополе. Эта миссия остается и революционной миссией Новой России.

Великая имперская тайна Николая II

С другой стороны, следует рассмотреть некоторые соображения высшего политического порядка, должные прояснить природу до сих пор не распознанной личности Николая II. Личности глубинного сакрального измерения. Ибо кровавый, всецело жертвенный конец Николая II есть прямое вопрошание великоконтинентальной, евразийской истории, ставящей на нее свою пламенеющую печать, спектральный пропускной штрих-код в нее. Он там. И всякая вещь, которая там, отныне все более и более приближается к его нетленному образу, образу его жертвенного дара.

Великая имперская тайна Николая II, как мне кажется, заключается в безусловной и неразрывной связи с великоконтинентальной евразийской миссией России. Николай II — стержень, ось, избранное орудие промыслительного начертания евхаристически закланной, четвертованной России, распятой между Европой и Азией во времена отделения замкнутой на себе самой Европы от погруженной в созерцательно-догматический сон Азии. Находясь непосредственно на жертвеннике, Россия непрестанно созидает — или хотя бы пытается это сделать — последнее имперское единство герметически выражаемых орлом дома Романовых двух ликов — европейского и азиатского — живого тела Третьего, Иного, Евразии, Великого континента, обретающего свою древнюю историческую идентичность в установлении Евразийской империи конца.

Тайный геополитический взор Николая II был — сегодня это совершенно очевидно — направлен в сторону Великой Азии и к планетарному выходу в Тихий океан. Одновременно император как политик озирал границы — от Европы к Ирану, Ираку, Палестине и Ближнему Востоку в целом, Центральной Азии, Афганистану, Индии, Тибету, Корее и тихоокеанским островам. Как бы предвидя великий проект Карла Хаусхофера, он визионерски готовился к битвам за последнюю Евразийскую империю.

«Всякий беспристрастный человек обязан признать, что Корея должна быть и будет русской», — писал германский император Вильгельм II своему кузену Николаю II. Вильгельм II, считавший себя «императором Атлантическим», называл Николая II «императором Тихоокеанским». Сам же Николай II всю жизнь и стремился стать императором Тихоокеанским, но от имени Европы, имея Европу за собой, Европу «от Атлантического океана до Тихого».

Секретные имперские контрстратегические службы Николая II, безусловно, изучали отдаленные великоконтинентальные пространства в перспективе «имперской миссии» России. Они преуспели и в прямой конспирологической разведке. В начале 1917 года планы русского вхождения в Тибет и взятия его под имперский протекторат были полностью готовы.

Правление Николая II было отмечено поворотом России к Азии, к Asia Mysteriosa, мистическим броском императора Тихоокеанского к живому ее сердцу, причем из всех забот режима эта была основной.

Поэтому война с Японией, в которой Россия вроде бы «потеряла лицо», на самом деле была тайным браком железа и огня, имевшим совершенно иное значение, отличное от видимо-негативного. Жертвенное, литургическое, пророчески начертанное, утверждаемое в крови и через кровь «взаимопричащение» России и Японии во вкушении смерти и ее преодолении означало инициацию, открывающую путь к имперскому священному героическому причащению в высшем, онтологическом смысле этого понятия.

Свидетельство Карла Хаусхофера

Таким образом, Карл Хаусхофер не ошибся, когда в отпечатанном, но не подлежавшем распространению тексте под названием «Континентальный блок. Центральная Европа — Евразия — Япония» указывал на истинный смысл погребальных русско-японских церемоний, имевших место в предвоенные 1929-1945 годы как на литургически обращенные к воскресению павших в пятимесячном советско-японском противостоянии в Монголии воинов.

Карл Хаусхофер: «Обе стороны в одно и то же время получили приказ — из Москвы и Токио — остановить боевые действия. На издревле оспариваемой территории началась грандиозная, в японском стиле, погребальная церемония во имя душ погибших воинов. Несмотря на ее религиозный характер, вызывавший идеологические проблемы, на церемонии присутствовал прекрасно державший себя советский генерал Потапов. То, что организовали японцы, психологически было очень значительно. Во главе войск, маршировавших с развернутыми знаменами к алтарю мертвых, шел престарелый генерал. Все японцы твердо убеждены, что души убитых воинов реально присутствуют вокруг алтаря, получая послание императора. Безупречное присутствие на данной церемонии делает честь способности советского генерала и его офицеров к адаптации. Поскольку поворачиваться спиной к душам воинов невозможно, все участники очень долго шли вперед, обратя лица к алтарю. Повернуться спиной к присутствующим здесь духам предков является, как известно, кощунством. Церемония, пронизанная абсолютной религиозностью, представляет собой сточки зрения народной психологии нечто интересное и убедительное; она в такой же степени производит глубокое впечатление и на иностранцев, набравшихся различных впечатлений по всему миру; получив разрешение присутствовать на ней, они могут сказать: весь народ здесь твердо верит в переселение душ. Верит, что деяния на благо родины обеспечат человеку более высокое место по ту сторону земного существования, а «провалив» земную жизнь, упадешь вниз там. Это чувство переполняет весь народ, за исключением разве что некоторых ищущих собственных впечатлений свободомыслящих; люди действительно горят этим убеждением, и оно дает им силы идти на огромные жертвы».

Последнее слово, «появление последнего избавителя»

От окончательного обновления России сегодня зависит участь Европы и всего мира. Оно будет не просто обновлением, но исполнением предназначенной России последней имперской эсхатологической миссии — дать импульс политико-исторической, великоконтинентальной, евразийской интеграции Европы, а значит, изменить лицо мира, остановить движение истории по пути к необратимому последнему кризису, к полному расчеловечиванию и тоталитарной диктатуре небытия, к Антиимперии конца, призванной явить в себе всемогущество «тайны беззакония».

Совокупность условий, необходимых для спасительного обновления России, хорошо известна. Однако никогда не говорят о главном из них, от которого зависит все остальное, о необходимости появления «человека великой судьбы», «последнего избавителя». Ибо «появление» его будет явлением Божественного Промышления об обновлении России и о возложенной на нее последней спасительной миссии, будет означать, что время пришло, что переворот нынешнего положения произошел. Все это начнется тайно, а затем будет явлено при свете дня.

Извор: “Geoполитика.ru“